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I. SUMMARY 
Storey has focused its brief on issues that are not before the Court on this appeal while 
failing to justify the lower court's actual ruling under Idaho res judicata principles. 
Storey argues that the Court may affirm the trial court if the Trust did not establish below 
that latent defects are in fact present and at issue in the second arbitration-i.e., if the Trust did 
not "demonstrate by record evidence" that it "exercised reasonable due diligence" prior to the 
Payment Arbitration to discover the defects it alleged in the Defect Arbitration demand. E.g., 
Respondent's Brief ("Storey Br.") at 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 18, 20, 22-30, 31, 36, 49-52, 54. No such 
issue was before the lower court, which rejected the Trust's efforts to supply evidence of latent 
defects as irrelevant. The lower court deemed the evidence irrelevant because of the procedural 
ruling it made: it would decide res judicata as a pure question of law on the assumption that 
latent defects existed. As the lower court described its own ruling, it was 
predicated on an assumption that there well could be or probably might even 
have been latent defects . 
. . . What Mr. Hanks knew then or the owners of the house actually knew then 
or know now about these . .. [alleged] defects in construction or whether they 
are, in fact, latent defects I think is immaterial. 1 
The court took this approach because it might-and, in light of the court's ruling, did-
avoid the need for a mini-trial. The trial court ruled that, even assuming that the Trust could not 
have discovered the defects through reasonable diligence at the time of the first arbitration, res 
judicata nevertheless barred the Trust from pursuing such claims, accepting Storey' s argument 
that any defect claim arising under the same contract was barred by res judicata whether it was 
1 Supp Tr. Vol. I (Supplemental Repotter's Transcript on Appeal), p. 15, L. 21 -p. 16, L. 25 (emphasis added). 
1 
previously discoverable or not. Having exercised its discretion to adopt this procedural 
sequence, the trial court repeatedly declined even to consider the examples the Trust provided of 
actual latent defects, holding that what the owners knew or should have known about the defects 
was irrelevant to its ruling. 
Had the trial court decided to consider the question whether there were any latent defects, 
the limited examples the Trust did provide-coupled with the evidence that it would be months 
before the Trust could uncover the remaining defects by removing and replacing the roofs and 
walls-would have mandated a continuance of any hearing on such an issue until late 2008. 
Only then could the Trust have provided the full catalog of Storey's pervasive failure to perform. 
But, faced with the procedure the lower court adopted and the ruling the lower court then made, 
there was no occasion for the Trust to request such a continuance. At Storey' s invitation, the 
trial court ruled that it need not decide whether the Trust could establish that actual latent defects 
existed. This ruling and only this ruling is before this Court on appeal. 
Storey also argues that the Trust actually litigated the defective work issue in the first 
arbitration. See Storey Br. at 2, 8, 11-14, 23. This contention is wrong but also irrelevant. No 
evidence of any defect was presented or ttied in the first arbitration, even though the arbitration 
pleadings contained a general allegation of defective work. But even if some defective work 
issue had been tried in the first case, it was by definition impossible at that time for the Trust to 
present and try a latent defect claim-a claim based on defects it could not at that time have 
discovered through reasonable diligence. The trial court's erroneous ruling that res judicata bars 
undiscoverable claims is the issue on this appeal. 
2 
Storey has failed to sustain this ruling. Idaho defines a "transaction" for res judicata 
purposes as the material facts constituting the elements of the claim. It does not define 
"transaction" as the parties' overall contractual relationship where different claims depending on 
different material facts may arise from that contractual relationship. Idaho also does not compel 
parties to do the impossible: to litigate claims in an early action that they could not then 
reasonably discover. Where the material facts constituting the claim could not be discovered 
through reasonable diligence at the time of the first action, even if claims with the same generic 
label were pled (and even if such claims were actually tried), res judicata does not preclude a 
second action asserting the previously undiscoverable claims. 
The parties' contract-which Storey contends is the touchstone for applying res 
judicata-independently compels reversal. It limits the claims a party must bring in a given 
arbitration to those then actually kn.own. Even if Idaho case law held as Storey contends it does, 
arbitration is a creature of contract, and the parties may, and did, agree on their own rules, 
including those determining what constitutes a "new" claim for purposes of a second arbitration. 
Storey does not mention this dispositive provision in its Opposition. 
II.ARGUMENT 
A. At Storey's Urging, the Trial Court Ruled It Was Irrelevant Whether the Trust's 
Claimed Defects Were Undiscoverable at the Time of the Payment Arbitration, and 
Denied the Trust the Opportunity to Present Proof of the Latent Defects at a 
Summary Trial. 
Storey argues that the trial court's ruling must be affirmed unless the Trust created 
specific questions of fact by proof of defects that (a) were not litigated in, and (b) could not have 
been discovered by the exercise of due diligence at the time of, the first arbitration. E.g., Storey 
3 
Br. at 9, 54. The Trust had no such burden. The court adopted Storey's argument that it could 
avoid considering this question by determining that there was no exception to res judicata even 
for undiscoverable claims where the same contract was at issue in both actions. 
The trial court had initially planned to conduct a "summary" or "mini" trial in which the 
Trust would introduce evidence of construction defects that it contended had not been 
discoverable at the time of the first arbitration, and the trial court would determine which specific 
defects, if any, were barred. Storey proposed the "summary trial" in its motion to stay the Defect 
Arbitration,2 which the trial court initially granted.3 At that time, Storey was seeking discovery 
from the Tmst of information about the defects, since, as Storey stated, "Storey has the burden of 
proof on its plea of res judicata" as to any defect. 4 Storey argued that, to prepare for the 
summary trial, it needed to know the nature, extent and location of each alleged defect, the 
identity of people who observed it, when and how it was discovered, and what made the 
condition a defect or "latent."5 
However, the trial court then decided that it should first determine, purely as a legal issue, 
whether there was any exception to res judicata, assuming there were latent defects, where the 
second action arose from the same constmction contract, because the court's decision on that 
question of law might avoid any need for the summary trial on factual issues of latency. 
This approach was first considered at a status conference on April 14, 2008. The court 
decided to first determine whether the res judicata issue could be resolved as a matter of law 
2 Ex, No. 3, Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Temporarily Stay Arbitration Pending Hearing re: Res Judicata, p. 19, LL. 
18-19. In a later pleading, Storey emphasized that "the summary trial sought by Storey's Motion to Stay is the 
proper time and place to determine the res judicata effect, if any, of the [arbitration] panel's rulings in the prior 
arbitration[.]"' R, Vol. 1, p. 201, LL. 16-18. 
3 R, Vol. 2, p. 247, LL. 4-6. 
4 R, Vol. 2, p. 291, L. 14. 
5 Id., LL. 16-20. 
4 
rather than conduct a potentially unnecessary mini trial. 6 For this reason, no summary trial was 
scheduled. Instead, on April 17, 2008, the Court entered a Scheduling Order setting oral 
argument for June 19, 2008 on the issue of law defined by Storey's contention that latent defects 
were no exception to res judicata. 7 
The Trust's brief for the hearing described the decision the court had made at the status 
conference in terms that Storey did not dispute: 
On April 14, 2008, the court held a status conference regarding the summary trial 
re res judicata. During that hearing, Storey asserted that SVT's entire claim 
should be barred and not that only specific issues would be subject to the defense 
of res judicata. Storey agreed that for the purpose of this matter only on the 
theory of claim preclusion--in comparison to issue preclusion--the relevant 
facts were that its [sic] is the same construction contract and the same 
improvements which were at issue in first arbitration and the current 
arbitration. All parties agreed that those facts, but only those facts, were 
undisputed. From that discussion, this court determined that the matter of claim 
preclusion could be heard on motion before an evidentiary, summary trial on the 
issues. As a result, Plaintiff [Storey] filed the instant Motion which is in the 
nature of a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment on undisputed facts. If 
[Storey's] motion is denied, the court must then determine whether issues would 
be barred in the current arbitration. 8 
The trial court made a procedural ruling: the hearing to consider the fact question 
whether true latent defects existed would be deferred in favor of a hearing on a pure question of 
law-i.e., on "undisputed facts." If Storey's legal contentions were upheld, there would be no 
evidentiary hearing. The entire point of this procedural ruling was to avoid any need to consider 
the very evidence that Storey now contends the Trust should have presented on that motion-
6 R, Vol. 2, p. 322. The minutes are not entirely clear, but do indicate the court stated that "counsel wants the Ct to 
determine Res Judicata as a matter of law, can wait for counsel to gather [evidence] then make a decision, [but it] 
would make more sense for the Ct to look at Res Judicata first." 
7 R, Vol. 2, p. 337. 
8 R, Vol. 2, p. 372, L. 19 - p. 373, L. 1 ( emphasis added). 
5 
whether the defects alleged by the Trust could have been discovered by reasonable diligence 
prior to the Payment Arbitration. The trial court had discretion to define the issue for hearing in 
this manner in the hope of achieving efficiency and avoiding the hearing that Storey now in 
effect contends took place.9 
Storey's own brief to the trial court described a narrow legal issue for decision, 
contradicting Storey's current invention of a hearing that the lower court never held: 
IL ISSUE 
Are Defendants barred as a matter of law from pursuing their claim for 
construction defects in a second arbitration because Defendants made a claim for 
construction defects in a 2003 arbitration and both Defendants' prior and current 
claim for defects arises out of the same construction contract?10 
This description of the issue is in substance parallel to that quoted above from the Trust's brief 
for the same hearing: i.e., whether res judicata bars any defect claim because a claim for 
construction defects was asserted in the first arbitration and the "current arbitration" arises from 
the "same construction contract." 11 There is not a hint in this description of the factual issue 
Storey now claims was before the trial court: i.e., whether the "current claim for defects" 
consists of defects that were not discoverable at the time of the first arbitration through the 
exercise of due diligence. 
In the June 19, 2008 hearing, the trial court adopted Storey' s argument on the defined 
legal issue: 
9 See I.R.C.P. 16(a), (b) (court may make rulings in pretrial conferences to expedite the disposition of the action and 
of pending motions); Peterson v. McCawley, 135 Idaho 282,284, 16 P.3d 958 (Ct. App. 2000) (trial courts have 
discretion in fashioning pretrial orders for efficient case management). 
10 Ex, No. 6 (Storey Constr., lnc.'s Mem. in Supp. of Motion to Enforce Bar of Res Judicata), p. 3, LL. 19-22. 
11 R, Vol. 2, p. 372, L. 19-p. 373, L. I. 
6 
Latent defects do not appear to be an exception to the bar of res judicata under 
Idaho law .... 12 
After this ruling, the trial court invoked this purely legal decision to deem all efforts by the Trust 
to offer further evidence of the actual latent defects it was gradually uncovering "irrelevant." In 
the same period, Storey engaged in actions that would have been pointless had the Trust already 
fatally failed to show that there actually were latent defects, as Storey now in effect contends. 
In June and July 2008, as the Trust began removing roofs and walls and creating 
photographic and video evidence of the specific defects being uncovered, disputes arose over the 
extent of, and procedures for, Storey's access to the Trust's property. While the Trust was 
investigating, recording and repairing the defects, 13 Storey moved for an order to "preserv[ e] 
evidence," and to allow broader access for Storey and its retained expert to inspect the 
construction. 14 Obviously, Storey needed access and an opportunity to make its own record of 
the evidence because, if the trial court's legal ruling were reversed, there would be a hearing on 
the issue of which defects were "latent. "15 
A month after the res judicata ruling, in a brief on Storey's motion for authority to inspect 
the property, Storey argued: 
Storey is seeking access to Defendant's property because even though the 
arbitration is barred, that ruling could be reversed by the Supreme Court. In the 
event of a reversal, Defendants would have proceeded with demolition and repairs 
12 Tr, Vol. 1, p. 200, L. 25 -p. 201, L. I. 
13 R, Vol. 3, p. 533, L. 23 - p. 534, L. 8 (affidavit of Rick Stark, an employee of the Trust's contractor performing 
demolition and repair of defective structures). 
14 R, Vol. 3, p. 471, LL. 10-22 (Storey's motion for inspection of the property, filed July 9, 2008, seeking 
r,reservation of evidence); id. p. 472, L. 21 -p. 473, L. 11 (seeking access for Storey's retained expert). 
5 On September 5, 2008, Storey and the Trust filed a Stipulation for Protective Order agreeing to terms for 
inspection of the property, preservation of evidence, and for the Trust to supply information on defects. R, Vol. 3, 
pp. 569-73. 
7 
thereby destroying evidence and eliminating Storey' s ability to investigate and 
· I S . d 16 mspect un ess access to torey ts grante . 
The minutes of the oral argument on this motion state that Storey argued that "defendants [sic -
Storey] seek access to property to see if the alleged defects were latent."17 The trial court 
concluded that, because of the pending appeal of its ruling, the "Ct is not governing a discovery 
process," and "these are all issues for a later hearing."18 
Storey thus conceded that the very evidence it now contends the Trust should have 
presented in early June was still being developed and that the full extent of the defects at issue-
and the question whether they were latent-depended upon the results of a process that would go 
on for months and to which Storey needed access to prepare for the potential later hearing. 
The trial court later expressly confirmed that, in its prior ruling-the only ruling before 
this Court-it had assumed that there were latent defects and had ruled that res judicata baned 
an arbitration of such defects. The Trust filed a Motion for Reconsideration, submitting 
affidavits evidencing some of the additional latent defects that had been uncovered since the 
ruling, during the first few weeks of the demolition and repair work. 19 The trial court held: 
The issue that seems to be raised by the affidavits and by this motion to 
reconsider is, look, judge, these are, in fact, latent defects. Look, we have 
affidavits that show these were defects or there are defects and/or they might 
show that these defects are latent and could not have been discovered . 
. . . I'm not changing or modifying my prior ruling . ... 
It is my view and my recollection as to the motion for summary judgment 
on the res judicata issue that that ruling was predicated on an assumption that 
16 R, Vol. 3, p. 544, LL. 1-4 (emphasis added) (Storey's reply briefon motion for inspection, filed July 21, 2008). 
17 R, Vol. 3, p. 565. 
18 Id. p. 566 (emphasis added). 
19 R, Vol. 3, No. 75, pp. 448-49 (Motion for Reconsideration and Notice of Hearing (June 30, 2008)); id. No. 94 
(Amended Notice of Hearing (Aug. 7, 2008)). 
8 
there well could be or probably might even have been latent defects. . . . What 
Mr. Hanks knew then or the owners of the house actually knew then or know 
now about these . .. [alleged] defects in construction or whether they are, in 
fact, latent defects I think is immaterial. 20 
This record plainly demonstrates three things. First, in accepting Storey's contention 
regarding Idaho law on res judicata, the trial court ruled only on the narrow legal issue whether, 
assuming the alleged defects were latent, res judicata would still bar the Trust's claim because 
they arose out of the same construction contract that was involved in the first arbitration. 
Second, the summary trial that was originally planned was scratched because the question 
whether there were latent defects was now irrelevant. Third, had there been such a hearing, it 
could not have occurred for months--even Storey claimed it needed to engage in intensive 
inspection of the dismantled roofs and walls over a period of months in order to "see if the 
alleged defects are latent. "21 
Had the trial court rejected Storey's version of Idaho law and required the Trust to 
establish which defects were latent and thus eligible for arbitration, the Trust would have been 
entitled to a continuance of several months because the work was scheduled to continue through 
at least October 2008.22 The trial court rendered any such motion both futile and improper when 
it made the procedural decision to avoid the hearing on that issue if it adopted Storey's legal 
contention, which it then did. 
20 Supp Tr, Vol. I (Supplemental Reporter's Transcript on Appeal), p. 15, L.21- p. 16, L. 25 (emphasis added). 
Storey argues that the Trust failed to respond to discovery regarding the defects (Storey Br. at 4 & n.11). The trial 
court ruled that the existence of actual defects was "immaterial." Further, the main "discovery" process was the 
investigation and repair work that took place for months after the trial court's ruling, all of which was observed and 
recorded by Storey. 
21 R, Vol. 3, p. 565. 
22 See R, Vol. 3, p. 534 (Mr. Stark stated in bis July 17, 2008 affidavit that the schedule for demolition, inspection 
and repair was already ''close to rmming into the winter season."). 
9 
In short, Storey succeeded in confining the ruling below to a pure question of law, but 
would now prefer to have this Court affirm on the basis that the Trust failed to present evidence 
that that very ruling defined as irrelevant. 
B. The Trust Did Present Evidence of Actual Latent Defects. 
At the time of the trial court's ruling, the Trust's investigation into the defects had barely 
begun, and discovery was barely underway. But, in order to provide some factual context for its 
legal contentions, the Trust submitted affidavits providing examples of latent defects that had 
appeared by the time its brief was due. 
The Trust filed the affidavit of Don Jackson, who had been caretaker of the Trust's 
property since March 2005, and was familiar with events described in the log maintained by his 
predecessor. 23 Jackson had personally observed structural failures that revealed underlying 
construction defects that had been concealed by roofing and by interior and exterior walls and 
first manifested themselves through damage appearing after the first arbitration: 
• After heavy snowfall in the winter of 2005/2006, Mr. Jackson could see that the 
snow accumulations on the roof of the main house and guest cabins were 
migrating downward, indicating a failure of the "cold roof'; that, as a result of 
this failure, ice dams formed which damaged the metal roofs and sent ice crashing 
through windows of the main house and damaged lower roofs on the cabins. 24 
Only through destructive testing in 2007 was it possible to confirm that the cold 
23 R, Vol. 2, p. 361, L. 26-p. 362, L 13. 
24 R, Vo1. 2, p. 362, L 14 - p. 363, L. 5. Contrary to Storey's assertion (Storey Br. at 21), Mr. Jackson's affidavit 
described defective cold roofs causing ice dams not only on the main house, but also on the cabins. Id. p. 362, L. 27 
- p. 363, L. 6. 
10 
roofs had been constructed improperly and not in accordance with the 
architectural plans. 25 
• At the time of those heavy snow loads, Jackson observed that in the roof structure 
of the cabins, two of the 4x4 sleepers broke, the cantilevered 2x6 purlins broke, 
and the metal roofing bent and had to be replaced. 26 
• In the winter of 2004 (under the previous caretaker) and the spring of 2005 
(during Mr. Jackson's tenure), water intrusion first became evident. By 2008, 
water was consistently invading the house around window casings and between 
the ceiling and chimney masonry, and was pooling on the floors. 27 
• In September 2005, the front entry stairs collapsed into the soil, revealing that the 
soil surrounding the house had not been properly compacted. That led to the 
discovery that other structures had also settled excessively, and had to be 
replaced. 28 
• Mr. Jackson described how, in July 2005, water flooded into the house when 
painters attempted to power-wash the exterior of the house next to large timber 
beams which extended from the exterior into the interior of the house. That led to 
the discovery of a lack of flashing or exterior sealing of the beams. 29 
• The Trust's ensuing intrusive investigation also revealed that Storey had left large 
rough cut holes in the sub roofs of all three cabins, allowing a direct path for 
75 Id., p. 364, L. 25 - p. 365, L. 11. The contract contained a five-year warranty on the roof, in addition to the 
f;,eneral 18-month warranty to which Storey refers (Storey Br. at 16). See Trust Br. at 2 n.5, 34. 
Id., p. 363, LL. 6-9. 
27 Id., p. 363, LL. 10-19. 
28 ld., p. 363, LL. 22-26. 
29 ld., p. 364, LL. 3-15. 
11 
water intrusion, and had improperly finished the roof so that water was directed 
behind or in front of the shear wall and/or siding. 30 
The trial court took no interest in this evidence. At the June 19, 2008 oral argument on 
the ruling below, the trial court agreed with the statement by John Hanover, counsel for the 
Trust, that it was not a summary judgment hearing, and that the key stipulated fact underlying the 
issue before the comt was that the two arbitrations involved the same contract.31 When Mr. 
Hanover offered to provide illustrative evidence of the actual latent defects, the court said: "I 
can't consider it. . . . Whatever they may or may not show won't be of any value on the legal 
questions I have to resolve."32 
The Trust's repair work and investigation continued for over four months after the 
hearing.33 Three months after the trial court's ruling that even latent defect claims would be 
barred by res judicata, the Trust attempted to submit additional evidence of defects being 
uncovered in the investigation as part of a motion for reconsideration34 in the hope that the 
clearly undiscoverable-and serious-nature of the defects might induce the trial court to 
reevaluate the wisdom of barring all latent defect claims as a matter of law. That evidence 
included the Affidavit of Richard Stark, an employee of the contractor retained by the Trust to 
investigate and design repairs for the structural deficiencies.35 Mr. Stark stated that during the 
investigation in July 2008, he discovered: 
30 Id., p. 365, LL. 14-22. 
31 Tr, Vol. l, p. 173, LL. 20-25. 
32 Tr, Vol. 1, p. 174, LL. 1-21 (emphasis added). 
33 R, Vol. 3, p. 533, L. 23-p. 534, L. 8; R, Vol. 3, p. 590, 'fij[ 1-4. 
34 R, Vol. 3, pp. 448-49 (Motion for Reconsideration and Notice of Hearing); id., pp. 567-68 (Amended Notice of 
Hearing). 
35 R, Vol. 3, p. 590, 'fij[ 1-4. 
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• In the three cabins, out of a total of 28 "hold down bolts" embedded in the 
concrete foundation, 13 were not connected to the wood framing. These bolts are 
designed to attach the framing to the foundation to transfer forces from the shear 
panels of a structure to the foundation to provide stability.36 To examine the 
bolts, it had been necessary to dig through the blown insulation. To repair the 
defective connections, it had been necessary to remove part of the exterior siding 
and structural plywood.37 
• When siding was removed to install the missing hold-down bolt connections, 
Stark discovered that the specified nailing for the structural panels had been 
omitted by Storey. Like the hold-down bolts, the nailing pattern of the shear 
panel wall is an integral part of the structural system. The defective nailing 
became visible only through removal of the siding-and the siding would not 
have been remov¢d but for the fact that removal was necessary to instaH the 
missing hold-down bolt connections.38 
If the issue before the trial court had been as Storey now claims, the Trust's evidence would have 
created a question of fact regarding whether and to what extent latent defects existed. Further, 
during the period prior to the trial court's ruling on the motion for reconsideration, Storey itself 
had advised the trial court: 
36 Id., p. 590, Tl[ 5-9. 
37 Id., p. 591, <Jffi 10-12. 
38 Id., p. 591, <J[ 13-14. Contrary to Storey's assertion (Storey Br. at 22), the Trust did move to supplement the 
Clerk's Record with this evidence. R, Vol. 3, pp. 608-609 (Request for Supplementation of Clerk's Record); id., p. 




Storey needs to inspect the plaster, wall joints, and floor joints to see if there are 
signs of cracking or distress caused by inadequate shear wall construction. 
Defendants complain about surface drainage. Storey needs to inspect walls 
throughout to see if there are signs of leakage or moisture intrusion. 39 
[D]efendants [sic - Storey] seek access to property to see if the alleged defects 
were latent.40 
Between the Trust's affidavits and Storey's own protestations of its need to monitor 
closely the months-long investigation and repair work, the court had before it very substantial 
evidence that (a) latent defects had been discovered and (b) evidence bearing on the issue of 
latent defects was being revealed as the Trust's repair work proceeded-even as late as 
September 22, 2008. The months-long process of uncovering the evidence would have 
precluded even consideration of a motion addressing the fact question of which of the Trust's 
alleged defects were latent before November, 2008, when the Trust would have the facts in hand. 
The Trust would probably have needed-and been entitled to-a further delay in any such 
hearing to conduct discovery in light of the evidence it had uncovered regarding Storey's work. 
lfthe Trust had a burden on this appeal to support reversal of a ruling that there were no 
latent defects, the record would support remand for a hearing to consider all the evidence the 
Trust has now uncovered while Storey extensively monitored that work. But the trial court made 
no such ruling. Instead, the court denied the Trust's motion for reconsideration, and reconfirmed 
the limited scope of the issue it had previously decided: 
39 R, Vol. 3, p. 464, LL. 3-6. See also R, Vol. 3, p. 553, L. 19 - p. 554, L. 2 (Storey stated in an affidavit: 
"Defendants' structures have metal roofs. Underneath those roofs there is substantial construction work that can be 
observed only after the roof is removed. . .. Defendants plan to remove roof purlins, blocking, sleepers, and 
sheeting. In order to demonstrate Storey's workmanship and conformity of Storey's work to the plans and 
specifications, ... having regular access to Defendants' property for Storey and Storey's experts is critical."). 
40 R, Vol. 3, p. 565. 
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I'm not changing or modifying my firior ruling. . . . [W]hether they are, in fact, 
latent defects I think is immaterial. 1 
C. The Record Contains Admissible Evidence of Latent Defects and of the Need for 
Extensive Further Investigation. 
Storey's argument that Mr. Jackson's testimony is inadmissible (Storey Br. at 28-30) is 
no basis for affirmance for several reasons.42 First, as Storey said, the trial court never ruled on 
Storey's motion to strike Mr. Jackson's affidavit 
... because the trial court decided as a matter of law that there was no latent 
defect exception to res judicata. (Storey Br. at 5.) 
I.e., the trial court's erroneous ruling on res judicata made the Jackson affidavit irrelevant along 
with all the other evidence the Trust offered in order to show actual latent defects. 
Second, Storey concedes that it will be Storey's burden at trial-not the Trust's-to 
establish that one or more defects the Trust now alleges could have been discovered with "due 
diligence" in 2003.43 If Storey's current version of the issue before the trial court were correct, 
then it was Storey, not the Trust, that failed to sustain its burden. Storey made no effort to do so 
because it had successfully contended that the court need not and should not decide the issue of 
latency. 
Third, the trial court had made a procedural ruling that would have made a 56(f) motion 
by the Ttust improper and futile. Storey now contends the Trust should have made such a 
41 Supp Tr, Vol. I (Supplemental Reporter's Transcript on Appeal), p. 16, LL.3-25 (italics added). 
42 In the trial court, Storey moved to strike Mr. Jackson's affidavit "on the ground the affidavit is based on hearsay, 
does not fix blame for any defects on Storey, is not based on 2003 knowledge or information, and/or is irrelevant 
because it does not attempt to demonstrate that the defects about which complaint is now made could [sic - could 
not] have been discovered with due diligence prior to the 2003 arbitration." R, Vol. 3, p. 414, L. 21 - p. 415, L. 2. 
Storey now adds that Mr. Jackson is not an expert, and cannot testify to "due diligence" efforts prior to 2003. Storey 
Br. at 28-29. 
43 R, Vol. 2, p. 291, L. 14. 
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motion (Storey Br. at 49-50) but Storey must live with its own procedural success below. Storey 
persuaded the trial court to sequence the hearings in order to avoid considering the issue of latent 
defects if it agreed with Storey's legal contention. The court did, and it consistently declined to 
listen to evidence of actual latent defects. 
In view of the trial court's chosen procedure, the Trust simply made an effort to provide 
examples of the latent defects that its own caretaker, Mr. Jackson, and (later) its repair 
contractor, Mr. Stark, had discovered so far. This evidence was admissible on the issue of the 
existence of latent defects. Mr. Jackson is qualified as a percipient witness to describe what he 
saw and to relate it to a business record created by the previous caretaker. 44 Mr. Stark's 
description of the missing hold-down connections and the missing shear wall nailing is obviously 
admissible, as is his testimony that these conditions were hidden.45 Storey's own contentions in 
seeking inspection rights during the removal and reinstallation of the roofs and walls eloquently 
attest that the conditions being uncovered were not readily apparent-i.e., Storey insisted on 
constant monitoring because Storey recognized that the only moment in time when evidence of 
the nature and extent of the defects would be revealed was as the individual sections of the roofs 
and walls were removed and in the short period before the deficiencies then revealed were 
repaired and the roof or siding section was replaced. These events were occurring constantly in 
the period June-October 2008.46 
44 R, Vol. 2, p. 361, L. 20-p. 362, L. 13. 
45 R, Vol. 3, p. 590, '![ 5 -p. 591, '![ 14. 
46 See R, Vol. 3, p. 471, LL. 10-22 (Storey's motion for inspection, filed July 9, 2008, seeking preservation of 
evidence); id., p. 465, LL. 16-20 (seeking access for Storey's retained expert); id., p. 544, LL. 1-4 (Storey's reply 
brief on motion for inspection, filed July 21, 2008, stating Storey's need for immediate access while demolition and 
repairs are done). 
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D. Storey Concealed Its Own Defective Work. 
Storey argues that it did not actively conceal defective work, but even on the limited facts 
available to the Trust at the time of the rulings below it is clear that Storey' s actions prevented 
the Trust from discovering important defects until they manifested themselves in perceptible 
damage. Mr. Jackson and Mr. Stark's affidavits disprove Storey's assertion that "[tJhere is no 
affidavit that says any defect was concealed or was caused by construction and not by design." 
Storey Br. at 20. Storey had an obligation to perform the work to specifications and according to 
industry standards. Storey cannot credibly deny-much less disprove as a matter of law-that it 
knew that the specified shear wall nailing and hold-down connections were missing. Storey was 
responsible for installing both, and Storey failed to do it. Storey also knew the flashing was 
installed improperly, and that the subroofs had holes in them. Storey did or failed to do these 
things, and then covered up the defects by installing siding, insulation and the outer roof surface. 
Storey had the primary obligation to detect and repair its own deficiencies, not to bury them 
uncoITected beneath the siding and roof and hope for the best. Storey also repeatedly misled the 
Trust by assuring it that it had properly performed its work when it submitted progress billings 
and accepted payment.47 
The Trust was not obligated to, and did not, have a team of inspectors following Storey 
and its subcontractors around watching every worker every hour of the day to make sure they did 
the work properly before it was buried behind finished surfaces. That was Storey' s obligation. 
47 See Trust Br. at 6-8. 
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E. Whether the Trust Actually Litigated Any Defect Claims in the Payment 
Arbitration Was Not Decided Below, Is Not Before this Court, and Is Irrelevant to 
the Trial Court's Ruling. 
The second new version of Storey' s affirmative defense of res judicata is its claim on this 
appeal that some defects must have been actually litigated and decided in the Payment 
Arbitration and are therefore barred by issue preclusion, although Storey is unable to identify any 
specific defects, any evidence offered to prove those defects, or any reference to any defects in 
the award. See Storey Brief at 2, 8, 11-14, 23. Storey never asked the trial court to consider this 
issue, but instead asked it to decide the question of claim preclusion on the assumption that 
defects existed that were not discoverable at the time of, much less litigated in, the first 
arbitration. Having accepted this invitation, the trial court did not decide the issue whether latent 
defects existed or the issue whether actual defect claims had been litigated in the first 
arbitration-issues that would have been considered in the mini trial. 
If this Court reverses the trial court's ruling, and a trial is held on the Trust's defect 
claims, Storey-not the Trust-will bear the burden of proving that the Trust actually previously 
litigated some or all of the specific defects the Trust identifies now that its investigation is 
complete. However, all the evidence in the current record contradicts any such assertion. Trust 
Br. at 3-4; cf Storey Br. at 18. For example, as the Trust explained in its opening brief, the Trust 
sought a monetary award in connection with its other counterclaims against Storey but none for 
its general counterclaim for construction defects.48 See Storey Br. at 12; Trust Br. at 3-4. 
Storey argues that the arbitration award was a determination that Storey's work was in 
conformity with the contract (Storey Br. at 23). But that is an issue preclusion argument that 
48 Storey suggests the filing of the amended counterclaim indicates the Trust must have litigated defect claims in the 
first arbitration. Storey Br. at 17, 19, 25, 43-44. This inference is not merited, but is irrelevant to the Trust's right to 
bring claims that it could not have discovered-and thus could not have litigated or alleged-in the first arbitration. 
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depends on whether any defect issue was actually litigated. None was, and certainly the Trust 
did not and could not have litigated any latent defects-defects that by definition were 
undiscoverable until after the Payment Arbitration. The arbitrators' award is a basis for claim 
preclusion only as to claims that were reasonably discoverable at the time. The order barring the 
Trust from arbitrating its claim for latent defects is the ruling that is the subject of this appeal. 
F. The Trial Court's Ruling Was Error Because Under Idaho Law, Res Judicata 
Cannot Bar Claims Based on Facts that Were Unknown and Undiscoverable at the 
Time of the Judgment in the Prior Action. 
Storey contends that there was only one "transaction"-"the construction of Hanks' 
home"-so that any claims based on defects in that work had to be brought in the 2003 Payment 
Arbitration or be forever barred by res judicata. Storey Br. at 31. Under Storey' s theory, even 
defects that Storey had actively covered up, and that the Trust could not possibly have 
discovered by 2003, are claims that "might and should have been litigated in the [2003 Payment 
Arbitration]" and are now barred. Storey Br. at 32. Storey has not supported this argument with 
an Idaho-or any--case so holding. Even Storey appears to contradict its own assertions when it 
contends that the Trust's claims for latent defects should be barred because of "Hanks' utter 
failure to demonstrate that Hanks performed any due diligence before the 2003 arbitration," 
implicitly conceding that inability to discover the defects with due diligence would require 
affirmance. 
Under Idaho cases, Storey' s burden on remand will be to establish that the defects alleged 
by the Trust were discoverable with reasonable diligence in 2003. Under the patties' contract, 
Storey' s burden will be to establish that the Trust actually knew of the defects in 2003. 
19 
I. Two Claims Involve the "Same Transaction" Only If Both Claims Depend on 
the Same Material Facts. 
This Court's pragmatic analysis of a "transaction" for res judicata purposes turns on the 
specific material facts necessary to establish each claim. 
In Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 157 P.3d 613 (2007), this Court found that 
Ticor's overpayment to Stanion in the bankruptcy proceeding, and Ticor's later unjust 
enrichment claim against Stanion based on that overpayment, arose out of the "same 
transaction." 144 Idaho at 126; see Trust Br. at 21. Storey selectively quotes language from the 
opinion out of context while ignoring the Court's analysis, its controlling statements and the 
material facts. The Court did not simplistically rule that, because there was only one agreement 
between Ticor and Stanion, all claims relating to that contract were the "same transaction" as 
Storey argues. Storey Br. at 33. Instead, the Court based its decision on a narrower version of 
"transaction," holding that Ticor knew that it had mistakenly overpaid Stanion.49 The payment, 
not the overall contract, was the "transaction": 
Ticor's present claim [for unjust enrichment] arises out of the same transaction 
addressed by the bankruptcy court in the prior adjudication: Ticor's disbursement 
of sale proceeds.50 
The concept of "transaction" and the concept of due diligence are intertwined-the issue 
is whether the claimant in the exercise of due diligence should have known of the material facts 
on which the claim depended-the "transaction." In Ticor, the material facts were not the 
contract but the payment. Because Ticor knew of that material fact, it "could and should" have 
sought relief for the overpayment in the bankruptcy proceeding.51 
49 144 Idaho at 122-23. 
50 Id., 144 Idaho at 126 (italics added). 
51 ld., 144 Idaho at 125. 
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Although Storey cites Diamond52 four times (Storey Br. at 7, 32, 35, 36), it never 
addresses the Court's analysis of the controlling "transaction" in that case because it simply 
cannot be squared with Storey's version of the rule: the Court clearly did not hold that the 
contract between Farmers and Diamond was the "transaction." Had it done so, the Court could 
have disposed of the res judicata issue in a few sentences. Instead, the Court carefully analyzed 
the material elements of the two claims, holding that the "alleged slanderous statements made by 
Raney ... [were] the subject of the Idaho action" and were also the basis for the claim that had 
been reduced to judgment in Oregon-i.e., "Diamond himself relied on the statements made by 
Raney in the Oregon case as a basis for his fraud claim .... " Diamond, ll9 Idaho at 151; see 
Trust Br. at 19-21. The Diamond Court supported its approach to the "transaction" issue by 
quoting the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Sec. 24: 
What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction" ... [is] to be detennined 
pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are 
related in time, space, origin or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial 
unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or 
business understanding or usage. 53 
The Restatement approach approved by this Court is a far cry from the simplistic rule that Storey 
persuaded the lower court to apply. For this reason, Storey never addresses this Restatement 
formulation in its brief. 
Even more tellingly, Storey never mentions the portion of the arbitration provision of the 
contract providing that, in any single arbitration under the contract, 
52 Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146,804 P.2d 319 (1990). 
53 Diamond, 119 Idaho at 150 (italics added). 
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[t]he party filing a notice of demand for arbitration must assert in the demand all 
Claims then known to that party on which arbitration is permitted to be 
demanded.54 
That provision-in the very contract Storey claims to be the ''transaction"-unmistakably 
establishes the "parties' expectations or business understanding." Storey never addresses the fact 
that the contract's definition of the paities' duties to bring claims in a single arbitration is 
obviously controlling here since the proceedings at issue are not judicial proceedings but are 
creations of the parties' agreement. The contract does not even require "due diligence," but 
requires only that the party bring all claims actually "then known." 
Under Idaho law, the parties' expectations are material to the definition of "transaction" 
in a given case even where the two proceedings are court actions rather than arbitrations. When 
a contract provides for arbitration of disputes relating to the contract, the contract that creates the 
proceeding defines the claims that must be brought in an arbitration or be forever lost. This 
contract allows the Trust to bring a second arbitration asserting any claim not actually "known" 
at the time of the first. Idaho law would in any event allow a second arbitration to bring a claim 
based on material facts-i.e., specific defects-not previously discoverable by reasonable 
diligence since such material facts are the relevant "transaction." 
Just as Storey cited Diamond without addressing the Court's actual analysis of the 
"transaction" issue, Storey ignores the analyses in Aldape55 and Magic Valley.56 As in Diamond, 
the Comt in Magic Valley did not simply rule that, because both claims grew out of a single 
contract, res judicata applied. The Court focused on the material facts creating the two claims: 
the first claim asserted personal liability of the two individuals; the second claim sought to pierce 
54 Ap, No. 3, p. 21, Par4.6.5 (italics added). 
55 Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 668 P.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1983). 
56 Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434,849 P.2d 107 (1993). 
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the corporate veil to create the same personal liability; both depended on the same material 
facts. 57 Magic Valley reiterated the approval of the Restatement formulation in Diamond that 
Storey ignores.58 Magic Valley unmistakably used a "pragmatic" definition of "transaction" that 
emphasized the specific material facts underlying the two claims: 
This claim [veil-piercing] arose out of the same transaction that was the basis for 
Magic Valley's action in Magic Valley I and II-the liability of Helen and 
Margaret personally for the breach of the contractual arrangement .... 59 
The Court did not hold that the "transaction" was the underlying contract; it held the 
transaction was the material facts that would support, or defeat, personal liability. 
Instead of confronting the analysis in Diamond, Magic Valley and Aldape that shows how 
the Idaho court defines "transaction," Storey simply quotes the oft-repeated general statements 
that if the transaction is the same, then the second claim is barred.60 
Storey' s approach of ignoring this Court's analysis while quoting general statements 
extends to its discussion of Shirey,61 Andrus,62 C Systems63 and Hindmarsh64 (Storey Br. at 37-
38), all of which actually apply the "operative" or "material fact" definition of "transaction." 
These cases are not particularly illuminating on this appeal because in none of them was there 
any serious question of an unknown claim. But all four cases use the "operative fact" approach 
to what constitutes a "transaction." 
57 Magic Valley, 123 Idaho at 438; see Trust Br. at 16. 
58 Id. at 437. 
59 Id. at 438 (emphasis added). 
60 Storey Br. at 35-36. 
61 Farmers Nat'/ Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 878 P.2d 762 (1994) 
62 Andrus v. Niclwlson, 145 Idaho 774, 186 P.3d 630 (2008). 
63 C Systems, Inc. v. McGee, 145 Idaho 559, 181 P.3d 485 (2008) 
64 Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 57 P.3d 803 (2002). 
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In Shirey, this Court found that the "underlying operative facts are the same for both 
cases" because the issue that arose in a bankruptcy proceeding (the bank's petition for relief from 
the automatic stay) involved the "very issue at the heart of the Shireys' counterclaim" in the 
second action-the Shireys' rights in the collateral. 65 The Court held that the counterclaim issue 
"should have been raised in the bankruptcy court."66 Obviously, the Shireys' "knew or should 
have known" of the operative facts-their rights under the agreement-at the time of the 
bankruptcy case. 67 
In Andrus, the Court distinguished the theory of recovery from the operative facts giving 
rise to the claim, holding that "claim preclusion ... is not limited to theories that were actually 
litigated in the prior lawsuit."68 Both actions-the first, a claim to a statutory right of way, the 
second, an effort to condemn a right of way--entailed the right to use a road over others' 
prope1ty to access mining claims. The operative facts were the same, so the "condemnation 
proceedings could have been, and should have been, brought in the first lawsuit. "69 As in Shirey, 
the case involved no contention that the plaintiff was unaware of the operative facts at the time 
of the first action. 
In C Systems the issue in both cases was whether a transfer of assets was effected by 
McGee without authmity. The operative facts were the same. The main argument advanced 
against applying res judicata was apparently that the facts were not known when the first action 
65 Shirey, 126 Idaho at 69. 
66 ld. 
67 ld. 
68 Andrus, 145 Idaho at 777. 
69 ld. at 778. 
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was filed, but it was conceded that they were known when it was tried, so the issues "not only 
should have been litigated in the first suit, but actually were litigated and decided .... "70 
Hindmarsh was a classic case of two actions proceeding on identical operative facts 
relating to liability that were obviously known to the plaintiff at the time of the first action. The 
initial property damage action barred the second personal injury action because the same 
operative facts would determine liability. The only serious issue in the case was whether res 
judicata arises where the first action was in small claims court.71 
Storey does not explain how any of these four cases supports its argument that the 
parties' overall contractual relationship is the "transaction" without regard to whether the claims 
depend on the same operative facts. Instead, Storey ignores the factual and analytical context of 
these cases, just as it ignores the Court's analysis in other, more germane cases that demonstrate 
that a "transaction" under Idaho law is a set of material facts on which a claim depends. Res 
judicata does not apply where those facts were not reasonably discoverable at the time of the first 
action. 
Nor is there any authority for Storey's argument that when the court confirmed the 
arbitration award, the Trust could or should have moved to exclude latent defects "from the 
preclusive effect" of that judgment (Storey Br. at 45). The sole issue is whether the Trust may 
pursue claims for defects that were not discoverable at the time of the first arbitration hearing 
and entry of the award. 
7° C Systems, 145 Idaho at 562. 
71 Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94. 
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2. The Trust's Claims for Latent Defects Are Not Merely "New Evidence" of the 
Trust's Prior Counterclaim. 
Storey confuses the issue of undiscoverable facts without which there is no claim with ( a) 
mere additional evidence that bears on a previously known claim and (b) a mere change in legal 
theory where the underlying material facts are the same.72 See Andrus, supra, Aldape, 105 Idaho 
at 260-61 (operative fact was change in the river's course, second action merely changed theory 
of recovery from adverse possession to accretion), and Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 
Idaho 610, 613, 615, 826 P.2d 1322 (1992) (trial court confused material facts on which a claim 
depended with mere "new evidence" of the same claim; a claim for failure to disclose inadequate 
water was based on different material facts from the claims in the first action, requiring a trial of 
whether the facts about the water had been reasonably discoverable at the time of the first 
action). 
The question is whether at the time of the first action the plaintiff knew the material facts 
on which the claim depends. In Durrant73 the Comt rejected a res judicata defense because, 
although in the first action Durrant had some information suggesting that U genti "might be the 
alter ego" of QFM, Durrant lacked knowledge of the material facts necessary to make the claim 
without potentially violating I.R.C.P. 11.74 The question was whether the material facts on 
which the claim depended were known. 
Kawai Farms applies the same basic principle. Storey tries to transform Kawai Farms 
into a test of whether the Trust has demonstrated its due diligence in discovering defects (Storey 
Br. at 54), diverting attention from the analytical significance of the decision. The Trust has no 
72 Storey Br. at 36-38. 
73 Durrant v. Quality First Marketing, Inc., 127 Idaho 558, 903 P.2d 147 (Ct. App. 1995). 
74 Durrant, 121 Idaho at 561. 
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obligation on this appeal to demonstrate that it actually exercised due diligence in 2003 because 
the trial court ruled such evidence to be irrelevant and assumed that undiscoverable, latent 
defects existed. Rather, Kawai Farms is significant here because (a) the plaintiff made a general 
claim of misrepresentation of the quality of the real property in the first action; (b) this Court 
held that a misrepresentation (or non-disclosure) regarding the adequacy of water was not the 
same claim because it depended on different material facts; ( c) therefore, even though a general 
allegation of misrepresentations had been made, res judicata did not apply if the facts material to 
the specific misrepresentation could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence, a 
question of fact. 
The key principle of Kawai Farms is not properly confined to cases of misrepresentation 
(Storey Br. at 54). Just as a specific misrepresentation is a separate claim if it involves distinct 
material facts, a claim of specific latent defects entails distinct material facts from a claim of 
different, known defects. This is inherent in the latency: obviously, if the defects were 
undetectable at the time of the first action, they formed no part of any "defect" claim then being 
asserted, or of any that could have been asserted. In "transaction" terms, the Court's reasoning 
in Kawai Farms demonstrates that a latent defect, not known or discoverable at the time of the 
first action, is necessarily based on different "material facts" from the first claim, and is not 
barred by res judicata. 
However, even if misrepresentation or non-disclosure claims were a special case under 
res judicata, this Court's statement that 
Kawai, as with any reasonable person, might very well have believed himself to 
be transacting business with a gentleman of honor75 
75 Kawai Farms, 121 Idaho at 615. 
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could be made about the Trust, which relied on Storey' s repeated representations that it had 
performed its work in accordance with contract requirements, as opposed to failing to correct 
defects that it then buried behind siding and roofing. The trial court deemed this and all other 
issues relating to the Trust's due diligence to be irrelevant in holding that no defect, no matter 
how latent and undiscoverable, could be the subject of a second arbitration. Storey' s knowledge 
of, failure to disclose and concealment of defects that would not be discoverable on reasonable 
inspection after construction support a constructive fraud claim.76 Where defects are buried in 
the completed construction, without notice to the owner, the owner has_no.duty to dig them up or 
lose any right to sue once they manifest themselves. See Bethlahmy, supra. 
The Trust obviously had no burden below to prove such a claim, but its Defect 
Arbitration Demand encompasses such claims and cannot be barred until the Trust has the 
opportunity to establish them. The Arbitration Demand is general and encompasses tort 
claims.77 The Trust had no duty to specify legal theories in the Demand, only the nature of the 
dispute.78 The Trust gave notice in its trial court pleadings that its claims would encompass tort 
and contract theories. 79 
3. The Virginia Courl's Decision in Waterfront Marine Does Not Supporl Res 
Judicata Here. 
Storey suggests that the Waterfront Marine8° case ("WMC'') held res judicata barred the 
homeowners' ("49ers") second claim for defects in their bulkhead even though those defects, 
76 Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 59, 61-62, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Trust Br. at 39. 
77 Trust Br. at 38. 
78 See Storey Br. at 54; Trust Br. at 38 n.71; Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, Rule R-4. 
79 R, Vol. IT, p. 380, L. 19 - p. 382, L. 25; Trust Br. at 38. 
80 Wate,front Marine Constr., Inc. v. North End 49ers Sandbridge Bulkhead Groups A, Band C, 468 S.E.2d 894 
(Va. 1996). 
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which had existed at the time of their earlier claim, had been "subsequently discovered." Storey 
Br. at 39. In fact, WMC is directly parallel to Andrus and Aldape. The 49ers discovered all of 
the design defects through the report of their expert before alleging breach of contract in the first 
arbitration. Based on the same facts, they changed their theory to breach of warranty in the 
second arbitration.81 That a storm and actual damage had intervened was beside the point-the 
storm did not reveal defective design. The 49ers had already identified those defects. The storm 
merely confirmed the weaknesses the 49ers had previously discovered. The 49ers made no 
latent defect claim. 
4. Storey's Citations to Personal Injury Cases Do Not Support the Trial Court's 
Ruling. 
None of the personal injury cases that Storey cites (Storey Br. at 56-59) provides any 
support for Storey's position. Each stands only for the recognized rule that governed in WMC: 
when a plaintiff litigates a claim for a wrongful act-for example, negligence causing an auto 
accident, a factual misrepresentation inducing a contract, or a construction defect in bulkhead-
and obtains a judgment, that plaintiff cannot later assert claims for additional damage caused by 
that same, previously-discovered wrongful act. There is no difference between personal injury 
cases and construction defect cases on this point (cf Storey Br. at 58). See, e.g., Houser v. 
Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel, Inc., 103 Idaho 441,446,649 P.2d 1197 (1982) (Storey Br. at 57) 
(personal injury); WMC, 468 S.E.2d at 434 (construction defects). 
Storey turns the rule on its head, arguing (contrary to Kawai Farms) that if the legal label 
·for a claim (misrepresentation in Kawai Farms) is used again in pursuing a different claim based 
on newly-discovered material facts, the label is a basis for invoking res judicata (here, "defective 
81 WMC, 468 S.E.2d at434-35; see Trust Br. at 27-30. 
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constrnction"; see Storey Br. at 58). This is precisely the non-pragmatic, formulaic approach the 
Restatement and Idaho jurisprndence reject. The controlling question is whether the operative 
facts underlying the claim are the same, or were reasonably discoverable, and should have been 
litigated in the first action regardless of whether the second, newly-discovered claim can be 
alleged under the same legal theory, or label, as a different claim in the prior action. 
Houser is a straightforward application of the rnle that a plaintiff cannot pursue a second 
action for additional damage arising from the same operative facts on liability-parallel to lVMC 
and to C Systems (suit for personal injury barred by prior action for property damage based on 
same material facts re liability). Houser is an even more compelling case than C Systems 
because Houser (a) had sued based on the same underlying liability facts and (b) had actually 
litigated both his knee and back injuries in his first claim. Unlike C Systems where the issue was 
whether the personal injury claim should have been litigated in the first action, in Houser a back 
claim was litigated. The second action simply sought additional damages for the same injury 
predicated on the same operative liability facts. Houser, 103 Idaho at 446. The court stated: 
In the prior proceeding, the claimant sought ... benefits for total and permanent 
disability on the basis of the knee injury sustained in the industrial accident on 
January 9, 1978 and back injuries allegedly sustained in falls in June and August, 
1978, which were said to have been occasioned by the instability of his injured 
knee. Claimant testified at length about these alleged back injuries and their 
effects on his physical condition and his ability to be employed. In claimant's 
subsequent application for hearing in the instant case, he sought additional 
compensation for back injuries allegedly sustained in a fall in August 1978, which 
was allegedly occasioned by the instability of claimant's previously injured knee. 
That is the same incident which formed the basis for claimant's claim ... in the 
prior proceeding. In sum, the proceeding in the instant case and in the prior 
proceeding arose out of the same operative facts between the same parties. The 
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Commission properly dismissed the application for hearing on the basis of the 
doctrine of res judicata. 82 
The Trust neither alleged, nor could have known of, the operative facts giving rise to 
Storey' s liability for latent defects at the time of the first arbitration. Unlike the claimant in 
Houser, the Trust is not seeking "additional damages" for claims previously alleged or tried; it is 
seeking for the first time to recover for defects (not merely damages) that did not manifest 
themselves until after the first arbitration. The facts the Trust did not have in the prior arbitration 
were those creating liability-the hidden defective work. Unlike the 49ers in WMC, the Trust did 
not identify Storey' s failures in the first action and then suffer later damage from those very 
failures. Rather, the damage that began to appear triggered the investigation that revealed the 
predicate for liability: the defects. 
Faulkner. Storey also cites Faulkner v. Caledonia County Fair Ass'n, 869 A.2d 103 (Vt. 
2004) (Storey Br. at 59), which simply holds that a plaintiff that has recovered for head injuries 
cannot bring a second suit for epilepsy arising from the same injury even though these damages 
are unexpectedly larger than at the time of the first action. 869 A.2d at 109. But the Trust 
neither tried, knew of nor recovered for the claims it now seeks to make: latent defects of which 
it was unaware. The point here is not the Trust's knowledge of damages, it is knowledge of the 
underlying facts-the specific defects--creating the cause of action. 
LeBeau. In LeBeau v. Dimig, 446 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 1989) (Storey Br. at 58-59), the 
court applied a similar analytical approach in the statute of limitations context-that if a plaintiff 
had sufficient knowledge of the facts to be able to timely bring a suit for damages for a wrongful 
act (minor head injuries from an auto accident), she should not be allowed to bring a later second 
82 Id. (italics added). 
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suit, beyond the statute of limitations, when she discovers increased damages from the same 
wrongful act (epilepsy caused by the head injuries). The operative facts giving rise to liability 
are the same in both cases, and some damage had occurred, completing the elements of the cause 
of action. The running of the statute was triggered, the court reasoned, 
[b]ecause there appear to be no disputed fact issues as to the knowledge of the 
plaintiff of the necessary elements for bringing her cause of action within the two-
,fl . • · [ ]83 year statute o 1m1tatlons . 
The "knowledge of the plaintiff' here, under the assumption the trial court made in 
barring the arbitration, was zero: 
... What Mr. flanks knew then or the owners of the house actually knew then 
or know now about these . .. [alleged] defects in construction or whether they 
are, in fact, latent defects I think is immaterial. 84 
The LeBeau court also reasoned that statutes of limitations should be applied consistently with 
their purpose to provide protection against the assertion of stale claims. LeBeau, 446 N.W.2d at 
802. By contrast, res judicata applies only to protect courts and litigants from having to litigate 
repetitious or duplicative claims based on the same wrongful act. Ticor, 144 Idaho at 123. To 
date, Storey has not had to spend any time or expense litigating any defect in the Trust's 
property. Storey certainly has not had to litigate any defect that is ultimately determined was 
83 LeBeau, 446 N.W.2d at 803. The same court later further limited its holding in LeBeau, and held that a plaintiff's 
"manifestation of asbestosis does not trigger the running of the statute of limitations on all separate, distinct, and 
later-manifested diseases which may have stemmed from the same asbestos exposure," reasoning that it served no 
public interest to require that, "upon manifestation of any harm, the injured party must then, if ever, sue for all 
harms the same exposure may ( or may not) occasion sometime in the future." Wilber v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas 
Corp., 476 N.W.2d 74, 78 (Iowa 1991). See also Potts v. Celotex Corp., 796 S.W.2d 678, 684-85 (Tenn. 1990) 
(declining to follow LeBeau and holding the statute of limitations should not require a plaintiff to sue to vindicate a 
wrong "at a time when injury is unknown and unknowable."). 
84 Tr, Vol. I, Tab 5 (Supplemental Reporter's Transcript on Appeal) at p. 15, L.21 - 16, L. 25 (italics added). 
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non-discoverable at the time of the first arbitration. The Defect Arbitration the Trust seeks will 
be the first occasion for Storey to defend itself against latent defect claims. 
G. On Remand, Any Remaining Factual Issues Concerning the Application of Res 
Judicata Are for the Arbitrators to Decide; It Is Neither Onerous Nor Unfair to 
Require Storey to Sustain Its Burden of Proof on Its Affirmative Defense Against 
the Trust's Latent Defect Claims. 
Under Idaho law, where a contract is susceptible of an interpretation requiring arbitration 
of a particular dispute, the dispute must be arbitrated. Storey wrongly contends the opposite: 
that the bar of res judicata is not arbitrable absent an express provision naming "res judicata" as 
an arbitrable issue. (Storey Br. at 59-63; see Trust Br. at 41-44.) 
This Court has held that "arbitrability is a question oflaw for the court" (Storey Br. at 
61). This means simply that this Court should decide whether the lower court or the arbitration 
panel will make the factual determination whether the Trust is alleging truly latent defects-i.e., 
should interpret the contract to determine if it calls for the arbitration panel to make that 
determination. Under Idaho law and this contract, the job is assigned to the arbitrators. 
The cases on which Storey relies do not support any different approach to the res judicata 
defense from other questions of arbitrability. In Lewis v. CEDU Educational Services, Inc., 135 
Idaho 139, 15 P.3d 1147 (Idaho 2000) (Storey Br. at 61 n.176), the court held that the son of the 
plaintiff was not a party to the plaintiff's contract containing the arbitration clause. In Murphy v. 
Mid-West Nat'/ Life Ins. Co. of Tenn., 139 Idaho 330, 78 P.3d 766 (2003) (Storey Br. at 62 
n.177), the court held the arbitration clause in an insurance policy was unconscionable and 
unenforceable against the insured. These cases addressed whether there was a binding 
agreement to arbitrate at all. 
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Neither Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398,913 P.2d 1168 (1996) (Storey Br. 
at 62 & n.178), nor Western Industrial and Environmental Svcs., Inc. v. Kaldveer Assoc., Inc., 
126 Idaho 541, 887 P.2d 1048 (1994), supports Storey's argument. Wolfe holds only that, when 
the trial court has ruled on res judicata as an issue of law, the court of appeals reviews the ruling 
de novo. Kaldveer holds only that res judicata applies both to court judgments and arbitration 
awards. Neither case even addresses the arbitrability of the res judicata issue. 
Where, as here, there is clearly a binding agreement to arbitrate disputes, and the question 
is the scope of the agreement, Idaho follows the general rule that"[ d]oubts are to be resolved in 
favor of arbitration" of that claim or defense. Mason v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 
Idaho 197, 177 P.3d 944, 948 (Idaho 2007); see Trust Br. at 42. An issue is within the arbitration 
clause unless "it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible 
of an interpretation that covers" the issue. Mason, 177 P.3d at 948. Courts dealing with 
arbitration clauses similar to the one in this contract have held that the defense of res judicata is 
a component of the dispute on the merits and is, therefore, a matter for the arbitrator, not the 
court. Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Transit-Mix Concrete Corp. v. Local Union No. 282, 809 F.2d 963, 969-70 (2d Cir. 1987); Sharp 
v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 434,437 (E.D. Tenn. 1979). 
Storey and the Trust agreed to arbitrate "any" dispute, subject to carefully identified 
exceptions, among which are no routine affirmative defenses. Further, the contract itself 
addresses the very issue of which claims must be brought in any given arbitration--all "known" 
· claims. It is appropriate for the arbitrators to decide how to apply this provision to the facts. 
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This contract is more than simply "susceptible" of an interpretation requiring arbitration 
of Storey's affirmative defense; 85 there is no sensible basis for interpreting it otherwise. Storey 
ducks this issue, and instead tries unsuccessfully to create a general legal principle that stands 
apart from the parties' agreement. But arbitration is a creature of contract, and Idaho law 
suppo1ts interpretations that favor arbitration. It certainly cannot be said "with positive 
assurance"86 that an interpretation allowing arbitration of the res judicata issue would be 
unreasonable. 
In holding that the court must decide even fact questions arising from the res judicata 
defense, the trial court once again erroneously relied on WMC. The WMC rationale is simply 
contrary to Idaho law, and is not even supported by the cases that court cited. 
The Virginia court reasoned that courts must control the outcome of any res judicata issue 
because it feared that arbitrators might not strictly apply the doctrine, which could defeat the 
doctrine's purpose.87 468 S.E.2d at 903. But parties choose arbitration precisely because it is a 
less formal and less expensive method of settling disputes and is controlled by the parties' 
agreement. Loomis, Inc. v. Cudahy, 104 Idaho 106, 108 & n.3, 656 P.2d 1359 (1982). The 
Virginia court ignored the parties' contract, and did not resolve doubts in favor of arbitration. 
WMC is contrary to Idaho law in reflecting a hostility to arbitration that Idaho state law and 
policy reject. 88 
85 Mason v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197, 177 P.3d 944,948 (2007); Int'lAss'n of Firefighters, 
Local No. 672 v. City of Boise City, 136 Idaho 162, 168, 30 P.3d 940 (2001). 
86 Id. 
87 The court stated that under the American Arbitration Association's Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, "an 
arbitration panel is not generally bound by legal principles ... (and] are entitled to make their decision based on 
what they deem to be just and equitable within the scope of the parties' agreement." Id. 
88 For the same reasons, the cases Storey cites from other courts adopting the WMC reasoning are also inconsistent 
with Idaho law. E.g., Deerfield Constr. Co. v. Crisman Corp., 616 N.W.2d 630,632 (Iowa 2000) (cited in Storey 
Br. at 63 n.182). 
35 
It is also wrong. The WMC court relied on cases that support the opposite result. See 
WMC, 468 S.E.2d at 903. The lesson of most of these cases is simply that the trier of fact in the 
second proceeding-whether it is a court or an arbitration panel-may determine whether a prior 
decision has res judicata effect in that second proceeding. See Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham 
Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1360 (1985) (arbitrators resolved the plaintiff's state law claims, 
but the plaintiff's federal securities claims were reserved for later trial in federal court because 
they were within exclusively federal jurisdiction and so not arbitrable; court held the earlier 
arbitration award barred the plaintiff's federal RICO claim because it was based on the same 
facts as the arbitrated state law claims); Clark v. Bear Steams & Co., Inc., 966 F.2d 1318 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (same, but denying res judicata because defendants had not met their burden of 
"showing with certainty and clarity what issues were determined in the arbitration.").89 Neither 
case decided whether arbitrators, in an arbitration proceeding, may determine the preclusive 
effect of the parties' prior litigation. The cases demonstrate only that the trier of fact in the 
second proceeding (the court, in those cases) may determine whether a prior decision has res 
judicata effect in that second proceeding. 
89 Similarly, in Rembrandt Industries, Inc. v. Hodges International, Inc., 344 N.E.2d 383 (N.Y. 1976) (cited in 
WMC, 468 S.E.2d at 903, and Storey Br. at 63 n.181), the conrt held only that in a court suit following a prior 
arbitration between the parties, the judge need not refer the res judicata issue back to the arbitrators in the initial 
arbitration proceeding to determine the res judicata effect of their award. In this case, that means only that the 
arbitrators in the 2007 Defect Arbitration would not be required to refer the res judicata issue back to the original 
arbitration panel in the 2003 Payment Arbitration. Like the court in WMC, the courts in other cases cited by Storey 
also erroneously relied on Rembrandt for their holdings. See Monmouth Pub. Schools, Dist. No. 38 v. Pullen, 489 
N.E.2d 1 JOO, 1103 (Ill. App. 1986) (cited by Storey at 63 n.183); Horwitz, Schakner & Associates, Inc., 625 N.E.2d 
670,673 (Ill. App. 1993) (Storey Br. at 63 n.183). 
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Res judicata is a routine factual affirmative defense,90 requiring the arbitrators simply to 
determine whether the Trust actually knew of the defects it now seeks to arbitrate (under the 
contract term) or, at most, whether the Trust should in the exercise of due diligence have known 
of one or more of such defects (under Idaho case law). Storey argues that this inquiry is 
burdensome since each defect must be considered and its "latency" assessed. Storey Br. at 41-
42, 47-48, 56. It is true that Storey's suggestion that the court must make this factual inquiry 
creates unnecessary burdens versus the arbitrators doing so, but there is nothing onerous or 
unfair about requiring Storey to establish a factual basis for its affirmative defense. 
If the arbitration panel does the work there is little additional effort required. The 
arbitrators will unavoidably receive all the evidence bearing on the issue of latency as part of 
hearing the defect case-i. e., the evidence of what was found when the house was tom apart and 
reassembled, including what had to be removed to reveal the facts. Having the same tribunal 
decide the res judicata issue is efficient. Having a court essentially replicate the work of the 
arbitrators simply to assemble a list of the claims for the arbitrators to consider is wasteful. 
There should be a strong legal compulsion before such duplicative work is ordered. Storey has 
supplied none. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court's July 2, 2008 Order and 
remand with directions to dismiss Storey's Complaint for Abuse of Process with prejudice and to 
enter an order requiring arbitration of the Trust's claims, including any issue of res judicata. 
90 The construction contract is governed by Idaho law. Res judicata is an affirmative defense that must be proven by 
a preponderance of the evidence. Ticor, 144 Idaho at 122. Idaho's Rules of Civil Procedure specify that res judicata 
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